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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 




Roberts v. Unimin Corp., 883 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 
Lessors claimed that a 1961 mining lease to Lessee should be deemed a 
tenancy at will and that the lease which provided for use as long as mining 
activities occurred on the property was unconscionable and had led to 
Lessee’s unjust enrichment. The trial court found that the lease created a 
determinable leasehold, and Lessors appealed that ruling in response. On 
appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the lease in question 
as well as the characteristics of both a tenancy at will and determinable 
leaseholds. The Eighth Circuit ultimately agreed that the interest created 
was a determinable leasehold. Accordingly, the court found that the 
leasehold in question created a determinable amount of time because it 
provided that it shall remain in effect as long as mining activities are 
actively occurring on the land. The determining event was not too vague 
and was the common and accepted lease language for mining leases.  
 
9th Circuit  
 
Gardner v. Chevron Capital Corp., 715 Fed. App'x 737 (9th Cir. 2018).   
 
Landowner brought suit against Gas Station Operator (“Operator”) for its 
contamination of property. The trial court dismissed Landowner’s claim for 
failure to state a claim because Landowner only alleged contamination of 
property through substances that fell within the petroleum exception under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”). Landowner appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, finding 
that Landowner was unable to sufficiently allege that xylene, the substance 
that contaminated Landowner’s property, was not a substance that derived 
from petroleum, and thus, did not fall under the petroleum exception of 
CERCLA. Because the appellate court found that landowner was not able to 
offer any details to support allegations that xylene was not a petroleum-
based chemical, the suit was barred under CERCLA, and the claim was 
dismissed with prejudice. 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss1/8





Trans-W. Petroleum, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 718 Fed. App'x 712 (10th 
Cir. 2018). 
 
Buyer of an oil and gas lease (“Buyer”) brought suit against the seller of the 
lease (“Seller”) for breach of contract when Seller attempted to rescind the 
lease before the lease took effect, instead extending its own lease on the 
property. At trial, the court granted Buyer declaratory judgment after 
finding Seller’s prior lease on the land had expired on the date Buyer’s 
intended lease was to take effect. Seller appealed this decision. On appeal, 
the 10
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court 
regarding the breach of contract. However, the appellate court found that 
the lower court erred when it declined to award Buyer damages for failure 
to show lost profits. The appellate court ruled that Buyer had shown with 
reasonable certainty that it suffered around $4,800,000 in lost profits as a 
result of Seller’s breach, an amount which need not be calculated to 
mathematical certainty.  
 
N.D. West Virginia  
 
Fout v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:15CV68, 2018 WL 1595870 (N.D. W. Va. 
Apr. 2, 2018). 
 
Lessors owned an undivided interest in oil and natural gas subject to a lease 
agreement with Developer, which secured Lessors a flat-rate royalty 
payment in exchange for development and production rights. Lessors 
contended that Developer underpaid the royalties owed and incorrectly 
deducted from the royalties, as well as failed to provide a truthful 
accounting of production on the lease. The district court determined that 
Lessors did not present evidence sufficient to prove (1) failure to properly 
account, (2) breach of contract, (3) fraud, or (4) negligent 
misrepresentation. Additionally, the court pointed out that punitive damages 
were not available in this case because Lessors had previously waived their 
right to punitive damages, and such remedy would not be available 
regardless in a contract claim, as was the case here. 
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Lucey v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 5:17–CV–66, No. 5:17–CV–126, 2018 
WL 771725 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 7, 2018).  
 
Landowners entered into an oil and gas lease with Producer. Operator 
attempted to extend the lease, but the extension was denied by Landowners. 
Landowners subsequently brought suit seeking a declaration by the court 
that the lease had been terminated. The matter, however, was settled and 
dismissed by both parties. The settlement provided for an oil and gas lease 
between the two parties, subject to more requirements, with the right of 
Producer to pool the lease with other units. When Producer pooled the lease 
into a unit, Landowners brought suit for breach of contract, declaratory 
judgment, trespass, and private nuisance.  Landowners claimed that the 
agreement required Operator to pay additional consideration if it failed to 
commence production on 2 wells on the property within 1 year of the 
effective date. However, Landowner claimed that because Operator 
obtained permits to pool the land before the effective date of the lease, the 
wells that were produced by Operator were not within the date specified. 
Thus, Operator breached the contract by not paying consideration for the 
lack of wells drilled within the specified date. Operator defended by 
claiming that Landowners failed to state a claim, because under the 
language of the contract, there was no breach. Trial court found that the 
lack of evidence of actual injury and failure to provide notice of the breach 
by Producer was sufficient to uphold Operator’s argument for failure to 
state a claim. Trial Court dismissed the claim accordingly. Please note that 




Plumley v. Sempra Energy, No. 3:16-cv-00512-BEN-AGS, 2018 WL 
1470224 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018). 
 
This case constituted a class-action suit against Energy Services Company 
(“Company”). The complaint centered around a natural gas leak in Aliso 
Canyon, California. Investors sued Company, alleging that Company made 
false and/or materially misleading statements regarding Company’s 
commitment to safety, the scope of the Aliso Canyon gas leak, and the risks 
posed by the gas leak. The complaint alleged violations against the 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) 
Rule 10b-5. Company moved for and was awarded a dismissal of the first 
complaint for failing to adequately plead the existence of materially false or 
misleading statements. The California district court found that Investors had 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss1/8
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not meet the pleading burden to establish a strong inference of scienter 
against Company. Investors presented evidence that Company had both (1) 
knowledge that the gas well in question lacked a proper safety valve and (2) 
a financial motive and opportunity to omit the information from its reports, 
but the court stated that although the allegations showed a motive and 
opportunity to commit fraud, there was not a strong inference of deliberate 
recklessness. 
 




J & L Oil Co. v. KM Oil Co., 51-898 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18) No. 51,898-
CA, 2018 WL 1075402. 
 
An oil and gas lease containing a Pugh clause provided that Lessee must 
drill five wells within a given time period. Moreover, Lessee must continue 
to produce in paying quantities in order to hold the entire acreage under the 
lease. Based on the language of the lease, with which the Court of Appeal 
of Louisiana agreed, if the five wells were not drilled within the time period 
or ever ceased to produce in paying quantities, then only a small amount of 
acreage surrounding the producing wells would be held by the lease. There 
was no question raised whether or not the five wells were drilled within the 
allotted time, however, there was question as to whether the lease was held 
by production. The court held that Lessor did not bear its burden of 
showing that there was no disruption in production on the five wells and 
that the subsequent producers adequately pointed out an absence of facts 
proving that there was continuous production. 
 
State v. Louisiana Land & Expl. Co., 2017-830 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/14/18) 
No. CA 17–830, 2018 WL 1312208. 
 
School Board sued Developer, seeking remediation of environmental 
damage caused by oil and gas exploration and production. Under 
Louisiana’s Oilfield Remediation Statute, the remediating party is obligated 
to receive awarded damages only for remediation as required to fund the 
expressed plan. On appeal, following a jury verdict in favor of School 
Board, School Board argued that it is the proper party to accept damages 
and perform remediation. The appellate court held that, because the Oilfield 
Remediation Statute's purpose is to create an obligation to perform 
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remediation work, the trial court was correct in determining that Developer 




Keyspan Gas E. Corp. v. Munich Reinsurance Am., Inc., 96 N.E.3d 209 
(N.Y. 2018).  
 
Insured sought declaratory judgment asserting that it was entitled to 
coverage and indemnification from Insurer for costs of environmental 
cleanup at two former manufactured gas plant sites. Insurer argued that it 
was not liable to cover costs incurred by Insured that occurred outside of 
the policy period and that any costs it was entitled to cover should be 
allocated pro rata over the entire period during which property damage 
occurred. However, Insured claimed that Insurer was liable for this time 
period because there was no applicable insurance coverage available on the 
market. The district court denied Insurer’s motion for partial summary 
judgment regarding the years in which the relevant insurance coverage was 
otherwise unavailable in the marketplace. Insurer appealed, and the 
appellate court ruled that under the applicable insurance policies, Insurer 
was not obligated to indemnify Insured for losses that were attributable to 





EQT Prod. Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot. of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, No. 6 MAP 2017, 2018 WL 1516385 (Pa. Mar. 28, 2018). 
 
Oil Producer became subject to civil penalties under the Clean Streams Law 
in 2012 due to leaks of impaired water from hydraulic fracture gas wells. 
Environmental Department theorized that the penalty should have been 
based on a “continuing violation,” wherein the penalty would last as long as 
any contaminants remained in the subsurface soil to passively enter into 
groundwater. Oil Producer expressed concerns that this theory would create 
uncertainty and unending liability. Oil Producer’s own theory was based on 
penalty being assessed and doled out for only days that pollutants were 
discharged from impoundment. Oil Producer at the time filed suit seeking 
declaration of unlawful calculation of the penalties. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania determined that mere presence of contaminants in water 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss1/8
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sources is not a violation of the Clean Streams Law which cites movement 
as the necessary element.  
 
Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 2018 PA Super 79. 
 
Landowners owned eleven acres in Pennsylvania, adjacent to two different 
gas wells operated by Natural Gas Developer (“Developer”). These wells 
have been continuously operated since 2011. Landowner asserted trespass 
and conversion claims against Developer, alleging that Developer had been 
unlawfully extracting natural gas from beneath Landowners’ property. On 
motions of summary judgment by both parties, the trial court determined 
that the rule of capture precluded recovery by Landowners. Landowners 
appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, claiming that the trial court 
erred in its determination that rule of capture precluded any liability on the 
part of Developer. As this was a question of first impression, the appellate 
court examined all evidence including (1) the depth of the alleged 
subsurface trespass, (2) the amount of oil and gas that was alleged to have 
been taken, and (3) the time period that had passed during the ongoing 
“trespass.” The appellate court determined that, although there did not seem 
to be evidence as to how far the subsurface fractures extended into 
Landowners’ property, there was a proper question of whether a trespass 





Allen Drilling Acquisition Co. v. Crimson Expl. Inc., No. 10–15–00277–
CV, 2018 WL 1219122 (Tex. App. Mar. 7, 2018). 
 
Two Operators entered into a Joint Operating Agreement together for the 
development and exploration of leased lands. The Majority Leaseholder 
(Majority Operator) held 77.5% of the leasehold in the agreement while the 
minority leaseholder (“Minority Operator”) owned the remaining 22.5% of 
the leasehold.  Majority Operator brought suit against Minority Operator for 
breach of contract for its failure to pay its share of the costs of developing 
the project. Minority Operator counterclaimed that because Majority 
Operator failed to convey all of the leases required under the agreements, 
Majority Operator breached the Joint Operating Agreement first. At trial, 
Minority Operator motioned for summary judgment for its claims that 
Majority Operator breached the agreement. However, the trial court denied 
the motion and granted the Majority Operator summary judgment. Minority 
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Operator appealed asserting that the trial court erred when it granted 
Majority Operator’s summary judgment motion and denied its motion.  On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco reviewed whether the 
agreements that embodied the Joint Operating Agreement entitled Minority 
Operator to the leases it claimed it was entitled to. The appellate court 
found that the trial court erred in its interpretations of the agreements, thus 
its determination of which Operator breached the agreement and was 
accordingly entitled to summary judgment was improper. Thus, the court 
reversed the trial court’s ruling of summary judgment for Majority Operator 




Dimock Operating Co. v. Sutherland Energy Co., LLC, No. 07–16–00230–
CV, 2018 WL 1310095 (Tex. App. Mar. 13, 2018). 
 
Lessee sued Operator, arguing that Operator collected more revenue than 
was authorized in the parties’ Seismic Exploration and Farmout Agreement 
(“SEFA”). The agreement provided that once Operator’s cumulative 
revenue equaled two times Operator’s costs from the well’s production 
revenue as compensation, Operator had reached “project payout.” Once 
Operator reached “project payout,” Operator would assign its well 
operations back to Lessee. Farmee claimed that Section 2.1 of the SEFA 
gave Lessee sole discretion to determine the extent of expenditures 
necessary for seismic exploration operation, and should thus be considered 
in determining Farmee’s “costs.” Lessee claimed that Operator’s seismic 
and land exploration expenditures were limited by an ensuing Operating 
Agreement, restricting Farmee’s authorized “costs” to projects not 
explicitly permitted by Lessee. The appellate court upheld the trial court in 
finding that expenses incurred for land and seismic operations are “costs” to 
be considered in determining “project payout” under the SEFA. 
Furthermore, the appellate court upheld that Operator’s ability to incur 
those costs were governed by the original SEFA agreement and not limited 
by the ensuing Operating Agreement, which was meant to govern 
expenditures made by Operator moving forward from the signing of that 
agreement. Please note that this opinion has been withdrawn and 
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Martin v. Newfield Expl. Co., No. 13–17–00104–CV, 2018 WL 1633574 
(Tex. App. Apr. 5, 2018). 
 
In 2001, Lessor entered into oil and gas leases with Developer. These leases 
covered the rights to production on approximately 600 acres of land. Over 
the next seven years, different parts of the land were assigned from party to 
party, eventually leading to Developer holding claim to fifty-five percent of 
all leases therein. Developer subsequently filed a designation of pooled unit 
on other nearby properties totaling 570 acres. Lessor asserted that 
Developer wrongfully pooled its land and that it failed to protect against 
drainage of Lessor’s unit as required under the lease agreements. Developer 
filed for summary judgment stating that it had no interest in the lease 
complained under and that it had no duty to protect against drainage 
because Lessor’s land was not adjoined to the land Developer had pooled. 
The trial court granted Developer’s motion for summary judgment and 
Lessor appealed. On appeal, the court determined that even if Developer 
did owe a duty to protect against drainage, the lands in question were not 
“adjoining,” thus the duty was never triggered. 
 
Midstream – Federal 
 
2d Circuit  
 
New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018).  
 
Department requested judicial review of Commission’s decision to approve 
natural gas pipeline construction, and Commission’s determination that 
Department forfeited the authority to review and control certification 
regarding water quality for the pipeline construction. Landowners 
intervened in this action, siding with Department to also oppose 
Commission’s actions regarding the pipeline construction. A Certificate of 
Water Quality is generally needed for such projects and is requested from 
Department because such a pipeline would contact and potentially impact 
bodies of water in its construction path. After receiving the Company’s 
request for a certificate, Department requested more information from 
Company twice, determining each time that their application was 
incomplete. Department ultimately rejected Company’s application for 
construction, but Commission then approved the application and 
determined that Department failed to respond within its allowed period for 
review for a clean water certificate, which was one year. Thus, its authority 
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to do so was deemed to be waived. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
denied Department’s request for review, also deeming them to have waived 
the opportunity to manage the request for water quality certification, which 
Company filed timely. The court gave no deference here to state agency, 
because Commission was not in a position to approve their application of 
the statutory requirements – in this case, the waiver period and when that 
time period started to run. Commission, a federal agency, and Department, 
a state agency, conflicted on their interpretations of when the waiver period 
begins to run, and this court sided with Commission. This court also 
determined that, as a federal agency, Commission did have jurisdiction to 
decide on Company’s application for pipeline construction (over state 
agency Department) because the pipeline is essentially part of an interstate, 
not intrastate system of distribution.  
 
D. District of Columbia  
 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16–1534 
(JEB), 2018 WL 1385660 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2018). 
 
Tribe challenged Agency’s allowance of oil pipeline construction on 
property protected by preservation and conservation acts and other 
requirements, including National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNIDRIP), asserting that 
such construction disrupted their tribal lands. Both Tribe and Agency filed 
motions for summary judgment asserting their opposing claims. In its 
motion, Tribe claimed that Agency must evaluate the environmental 
impacts caused by the pipeline holistically, rather than as “segmented” 
impacts. Tribe also asserted that it was denied notice and consent, which is 
in violation of treaty and trust requirements. Agency’s motion asserted that 
the NHPA claim was inapplicable due to the completion of the pipeline 
construction. The lower court held for Agency, determining that Tribe’s 
action was properly brought, but ultimately held that Agency’s actions 
authorizing the pipeline construction were not actually in violation of the 
referenced regulations. This court affirmed the lower court’s decision in 
favor of Agency, also concluding that Tribe had standing through its 
demonstrated use and concern for the land, and potential injury by 
Agency’s actions. The court also held, however, that no remedy was 
available regarding the violation of NHPA claim because the pipeline 
construction had already been completed. Numerous assessments were 
conducted by NEPA with no significant issues reported. The outcome of 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss1/8
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these determinations was previously remanded for further review, which is 
still pending. The court ultimately denied Tribe’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissing Tribe’s first count, while granting Agency’s cross-
motion for summary judgment.   
 
N.D. West Virginia 
 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 84.53 Acres of Land, No. 1:18CV9, 
2018 WL 1004483 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 21, 2018). 
 
Pipeline Operator sued Landowners, seeking condemnation and easements 
related to the construction and operation of a natural gas pipeline. 
Additionally, Pipeline Operator sought access and possession to land prior 
to paying Landowners just compensation. After the issuance of a certificate 
by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), Pipeline Operator’s 
project was subject to the Natural Gas Act in order to acquire property 
through eminent domain. The court found that Pipeline Operator was 
entitled to a preliminary injunction in order to access and possess the 
easements in order to avoid significant cost based on exigencies such as tree 
clearing and inactivity. The district court also determined that, in 
conjunction with granting Pipeline Operator's preliminary injunction for 
access and use of Landowners' properties, Pipeline Operator would obtain 




Cotton v. Texas Express Pipeline, LLC, No. 6:16–CV–453–RP–JCM, 2018 
WL 1419346, (W.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2018).  
 
Landowner conveyed land, subject to an easement, to Purchaser through a 
quitclaim deed. Purchaser brought suit for breach of contract claiming that 
Landowner transported radioactive materials through the pipeline easement 
against the terms of the easement contract. The contract provided that 
natural gas and gas liquids are to be transported through the pipeline, but 
radioactive materials are prohibited from being transported through the 
pipeline. Landowner argued that the clause that permitted natural gas to be 
transported rendered the prohibition against radioactive materials moot 
because natural gas is radioactive. Thus, Landowner motioned to dismiss 
the suit for failure to state a claim. A magistrate judge agreed with 
Landowner and recommended dismissal of the claim. Purchaser objected to 
this recommendation, and the case was removed to the Western District of 
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Texas. The court, reviewing the recommendation by the magistrate judge de 
novo, found that the magistrate ruled improperly when it recommended a 
dismissal of the claim. The court instead found that all natural gas is not 
radioactive and Purchaser should be entitled to amend its complaint to 
account for its previous failure to plead that Landowner was actually 
transporting ultra-hazardous material through the pipeline.   
 




B & R Res., LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 180 A.3d 812 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2018).  
 
Company requested review of a Board adjudication decision dismissing 
their appeal of an order issued by Agency requiring Company to plug 
several dozens of their wells. Agency contacted Manager to inquire about 
wells that appeared to be abandoned, later issuing a notice that Company 
would be required to plug the wells. These orders were met with 
noncompliance from Manager, and Agency requested additional 
information regarding a proposed schedule for plugging the wells. Manager 
asserted during these interactions that the wells were not abandoned, but 
that Company still intended to use them for production. This 
noncompliance with an order to plug the wells resulted in numerous alleged 
violations by Company. Company later stipulated that the wells were 
abandoned but that no funds were available to use for plugging the wells, so 
Company should be relieved of liability. Company also stipulated that 
Manager held no permits and did not operate any of the wells and thus 
should also not be held responsible. During administrative adjudication, 
Manager was determined to be an operator, with full authority to take 
action of the wells, and was on notice regarding the requirement to plug the 
wells. Therefore, Manager was personally responsible for the violations, 
since its actions were intentionally in opposition to the imposed plugging 
requirements, despite its authority to take action to comply with them. 
However, this individual accountability, labeled “participation theory,” was 
not supported by the administrative adjudication’s determination. The court 
reversed and remanded because the reviewing administrative board failed to 
assess Manager’s ability and resources to remedy the violations, or how 
much Manager could have remedied the situation, if it had made an effort.   
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Flynn v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., No. 942 C.D. 2017, 2018 WL 1463443 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Mar. 26, 2018). 
 
Landowners sued Public Utility Company (“Company”), arguing against 
Company's development of a pipeline system. In 2012, Company 
announced its intent to develop an integrated pipeline system to serve this 
purpose, the Mariner East Program. The first phase of the program utilized 
existing pipeline infrastructure to ship 70,000 barrels of natural gas liquids 
across the state. The second phase of the program would require 
construction of 351 miles of new pipeline to allow for movement of an 
additional 275,000 barrels per day. Company received authorization for the 
program’s second phase from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
(“PUC”), and Landowners filed a complaint through enforcement of 
Township’s Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance (“SALDO”). 
The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the attempt to enforce SALDO 
against Company was preempted by state and federal law, and (3) that 
Landowners had failed to state a claim. The appellate court affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, stating that Landowners had no claim under 
SALDO because PUC had exclusive jurisdiction and regulatory authority 
over Company. 
 
MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Res., LLC v. Cecil Twp. Zoning Hearing 
Bd., No. 1809 C.D. 2016, 2018 WL 1440892 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 23, 
2018). 
 
Company engaged in midstream services filed an application for a special 
zoning exception from Board to construct a natural gas compressor. Board 
added numerous conditions as a result of that special exception request, 
from which Company appealed. The court began by noting that Board was 
a legislatively created body that was given narrow powers to enforce health 
and safety standards, but it was not given power to regulate the operations 
of a private business. The court found that Board failed to show that 
Company compressor’s impacts would pose a threat to the health and safety 
of the community, and thus abused its discretion in enacting conditions 
outside of Board’s authority. Upon reviewing each condition, it was found 
that twenty-one of Board’s twenty-five imposed conditions were 
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. The only conditions found to be 
reasonable and enforceable by the court were that Company: (1) provide a 
spill prevention and control plan to the Township; (2) provide training for 
first responders at its expense; (3) provide copies of all procedures to be 
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followed in the event of an emergency at the site; and (4) work with local 
first responders to outline procedures that nearby residents should observe 
in the event of an emergency at the station. Please note that this is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 




Armour Pipe Line Co. v. Sandel Energy, Inc., No. 14–16–00490–CV, 2018 
WL 1546697 (Tex. App. Mar. 28, 2018).  
 
Assignors brought a claim against Assignees for ownership and payment 
for royalty interest in oil and gas leases. This case is an appeal of the lower 
court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment in favor of 
Assignees and denying Assignors’ motion for summary judgment, rejecting 
Assignors’ claimed royalty interest. The court reversed and remanded the 
lower court’s decision, determining that the trial court was in error because 
it granted a motion in favor of Assignees without adequate evidence that 
Assignors held no royalty interest and then granted a motion dismissing an 
accessory party, which was involved via farmout agreement on the basis of 
the initial erroneous summary judgment. The court also held, however, that 
the lower court was not in error in denying Assignors’ motion for summary 
judgment, since there was still a valid question regarding Assignors’ still-
held royalty interest. The court determined that Assignors would have to 
provide evidence that they were interest holders in the leases in place when 
the assignment in question was executed and they have not presented 
conclusive evidence to show this. The court relied on the remand procedure 
to determine the alternative claim by Assignors, since the court reversed 
and remanded the first claim, on which the second claim is dependent. The 
court also reversed and remanded the lower court’s award to Assignees of 
attorney fees since such an award is inappropriate considering the reversal 
of their grant of summary judgment.  
 
Downstream – Federal  
 
10th Circuit  
 
Anderson Living Tr. v. Energen Res. Corp., 886 F.3d 826 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 
Landowners brought suit against Operator for failure to pay oil and gas 
royalties.  At trial, the lower court granted Operator’s motion for summary 
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judgment on all claims. Landowners appealed. The appellate court upheld 
some of the lower court’s rulings but reversed others. The court found, in 
pertinent part, that the claims for royalties by Landowners based on state 
law were properly denied because of the precedent of the circuit court 
which rejected the marketable condition doctrine, that allowed Operator to 
deduct certain marketing costs before calculating royalties. Additionally, 
the court found in favor of Operator regarding whether it was proper to 
deduct taxes from royalties owed. However, the appellate court reversed the 
lower court’s decision regarding royalties to be paid to Landowners for gas 
used by third-parties, ruling instead that the free use clauses in the lease 
required Operator to pay royalties on all gas produced. The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals thus remanded the case to the lower court to calculate the 




MRP Props., LLC v. United States, No. 17–cv–11174, 2018 WL 1621562 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 2018).  
 
Company brought a claim against Government, requesting compensatory 
damages and declaratory judgment for contamination and hazards that 
Company claimed were allegedly caused by Government’s previous 
wartime action and control. Government attempted to dismiss all parties 
except Company or transfer the case to another venue.  This attempt was 
unsuccessful, so Government then filed a motion to dismiss. This motion 
was granted because the court found that Company provided insufficient 
evidence to support its claim for “arranger liability” which “attaches to 
persons who specifically arrange for the disposal of that hazardous waste,” 
even though it did have sufficient support for its “operator liability” claim 
since it could show that Government exerted control over general 
operations but not specific intent or specific actions regarding the subject 
hazards or contamination. The court dismissed Company’s initial amended 
complaint but designated such dismissal without prejudice to allow 
Company to later file an amendment within a specific time, giving it an 
opportunity to potentially provide more adequate support for its ‘arranger 
liability’ claim.   
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Jack's Friendly Serv., Inc. v. Twp. of Fairfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
No. A–0433–16T4, 2018 WL 1440002 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 23, 
2018).  
 
Constructor who sought to build and operate a convenience store and gas 
station on a tract of land sought variances and major site approval from the 
Board of Zoning. The Board approved and granted requests of Constructor. 
Interested Parties filed a complaint challenging the Board’s approval of 
Constructor’s application claiming the Board erred because it failed to 
apply the proper standards of analysis for the application. Upon review, the 
trial court affirmed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the claim, 
finding Interested Parties’ claims to be without merit. Interested Parties 
appealed their case. On appeal, Interested Parties argued that the application 
should not have been approved absent a showing that the proposed 
construction would enhance the welfare of the township that had prohibited 
new gas stations entirely. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the 
lower court after citing that the Board was entitled to deference, and, unless 
its decision was arbitrary and capricious, the court would not overturn it. 
When applying the correct standards to the application, the court found no 
reason to disturb the decisions of either the Board or the trial court. Please 
note that this is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or 
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Montana v. Wyoming, 138 S.Ct. 758 (2018). 
 
Montana and Wyoming are subject to the Yellowstone River Compact 
(“Compact”). Broadly, the Compact governs appropriative rights of the 
Yellowstone River. After ordering that costs shall be awarded to Montana, 
the Court provided several guidelines in its decree which are as follows. 
The Court first provided some general provisions, which outlined the 
compact and detailed the procedure for calls between the states. Next, it 
appeared that the exercise pre-1950 appropriative rights were generally 
non-violative of the Compact. The Court provided general reservoir rules 
and also placed specific limitations on Wyoming storage reservoirs as well 
as the Tongue River Reservoir. Montana and Wyoming are also bound by 
rules regarding the exchange of information. Finally, the Court’s decree has 




Bethpage Water Dist. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 884 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 
2018). 
 
Water District brought suit against industrial manufacturer 
(“Manufacturer”) alleging groundwater pollution due to operations at its 
manufacturing facilities. Water District asserted claims of negligence, 
trespass, and nuisance for the alleged contamination caused by volatile 
organic compounds entering multiple drinking water units operated by 
Water District. However, the issue presented to the court concerned when 
the statute of limitations for the listed claims should begin when said claims 
are caused by water pollution. Specifically, the court looked at whether its 
discovery igniting the statute of limitations began once (1) the pollution 
was detected in the well, (2) actual injury occurred, or (3) when Water 
District learned of the potential need to remediate or protect the well from 
contamination, either present or future. The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals ultimately determined that the statute of limitations for claims 
arising out of contamination begin when the injured party had enough 
knowledge that the contamination would require “an immediate or specific 
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remediation effort.” The court rejected the notion that the statute of 
limitations begins only after there is actual contamination, rather than the 




Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 
County appealed a lower court finding that County was in violation of the 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”). County operated four injection wells used to 
disposed of treated wastewater from its municipal wastewater plant. The 
treated wastewater is either injected into the wells for disposal or sold for 
irrigation purposes. The injected, polluted water may then find its way into 
the Pacific Ocean. County challenged the lower courts fining that it was in 
violation of the CWA through use of all four of its wells by not obtaining a 
special permit before discharging the treated water into the ocean via 
groundwater. On appeal, the court agreed with the lower court’s ruling that 
County was liable under the CWA. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling for the following reasons: (1) 
there was an immediately traceable source of the pollution – a “point 
source” under the act; (2) the act requires a permit to discharge into the 
ocean, even if the discharge was not direct, because the pollution was 
traceable; and (3) discharge into wells and not navigable waters is not 




Meridian Eng’g Co. v. United States, 885 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 
Contractor sued the government alleging breach of contract, breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of the Contract Disputes 
Act. The government tasked Contractor with constructing flood control 
features and the parties' contract was later modified several times after 
Contractor discovered potential structural damage due to an unforeseen 
water-producing sand layer, groundwater, and saturated soil. After the 
government suspended Contractor's work based on structural failure, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers terminated the flood control project. Ruling 
in favor of the government, the Federal Circuit found that saturated soils 
had been indicated in the contract and that Contractor had not undergone a 
Type 1 differing site condition. The court found that Contractor was not 
acting as a reasonable and prudent contractor in failing to foresee the 
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saturated soil and saturated subsurface conditions since the contract had 




N. Coast Rivers All. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 1:16–cv–00307–LJO–
MJS, 2018 WL 1256657 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2018). 
 
Conservationist filed a claim of relief, claiming that the Department of the 
Interior (“Department”) violated the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement 
(“EIS”) for a series of renewal contracts that authorize the delivery of water 
from federal reclamation facilities to certain water districts within 
California. Department filed for dismissal of the claim because (1) the 
contracts do not alter the status quo of current water delivery systems, and 
(2) that an EIS is only required in Federal actions which significantly affect 
the quality of the human environment. The court found that because the 
contracts were not an irreversible commitment of resources, an EIS was not 
necessary. Therefore, the court granted Department’s motion to dismiss. 
 
E.D. New York 
 
Hicksville Water Dist. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2:17-cv-04442 
(ADS)(ARL), 2018 WL 1542670 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018). 
 
Water Provider is a public utility that obtains its water form the Long Island 
Aquifer System. Electronics Manufacturer performs machining, heat 
treating, and chemical cleaning among other operations at a property 
alongside the Long Island Railroad tracks. Water Provider alleged that 
Electronics Manufacturer used Dioxane in its manufacturing process 
throughout use of the property. This chemical completely dissolves in water 
and is widely used in paint strippers, greases, and waxes. The chemical has 
been cited as likely carcinogenic to humans and can cause damage to the 
liver and kidneys. Electronics Manufacturer had ceased its operations at the 
factory in 2014 and reported to have removed all manufacturing equipment. 
Water Provider was forced to shut down one of its wells and alleged that 
Electronics Manufacturer contaminated its groundwater and was liable for 
remedial damages in the amount of $350,000,000 in addition to 
$600,000,000 in punitive damages. Defendant moved to dismiss the 
complaint. The district court determined that Electronics Manufacturer’s 
motion should be granted due to the fact that Water Provider was precluded 
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from advancing on negligence or trespass claims, but denied that Water 
Provider was able to proceed on all other counts including its public 
nuisance, failure to warn, and Comprehensive Environmental Response, 




Taylor v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., No. 14–CV–293–JED–FHM, 2018 WL 
1569495 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 30, 2018).  
 
Citizens sued Tire Company alleging that their personal and real property 
had been contaminated by toxins released as a result of Tire Company’s 
conduct. Citizens sought damages for medical monitoring certification of 
the citizens who resided on the property, as well as damages for the 
recovery of real property affected by the toxins. In addition to damages, 
Citizens sought injunctive relief requiring Tire Company to remediate all 
contaminated properties. Tire Company moved for summary judgment 
claiming that the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality 
(“ODEQ”) had primary jurisdiction over remediation for the contaminated 
property and thus the request for injunctive relief for such should be denied. 
The trial court rejected this argument and denied Tire Company’s request 
for partial summary judgment on the ground that the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine does not prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction where an 
agency fails to diligently pursue enforcement against a party violating 
regulation. Additionally, Tire Company asserted that the claims for medical 
monitoring costs should be dismissed because Oklahoma courts have not 
allowed such claims for relief without proof that parties actually suffered 
physical injury. The trial court agreed and dismissed Citizens’ request for 
medical monitoring damages due to their failure to present evidence of 
physical injuries attributable to contaminates from the plant. The trial court 
also denied Tire Company’s motion for summary judgment on claims by 
fifty-two Citizens who purchased their property after 2002, because it found 
a genuine dispute was present regarding whether there was a diminution in 
the value of the property of those individuals due to continuing 
contamination after 2002.   
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Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. City of San Buenaventura, 228 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
Environmental Organization filed suit against City, alleging that City’s 
diversion of water from a local river was “unreasonable” due to its effect on 
fish during the summer when water levels are low. City filed a cross-
complaint against other parties who also divert water from the river, 
alleging that it is the other parties whose water diversion is “unreasonable.” 
The trial court struck City’s cross-complaint, and City appealed. The 
California appellate court held that (1) reasonableness of water usage is a 
case-by-case determination, and although in California there is public trust 
interest in how the state’s water is used, that interest is not absolute; (2) in 
order for a cross-claim to be proper, the claims must be “related to the same 
transaction,” and the relation is determined by the facts surrounding the 
cause of action; and (3) regardless of Environmental Organization’s interest 
in proceeding solely against City, City had the right to bring in the other 
potentially liable parties in order for the court to examine whether junior or 
senior appropriators must share the obligation to maintain a higher water 
level in the river during summer months. The court held that because 
Environmental Organization was complaining based only on the water flow 
in the river, the court must consider other water users before it was able to 
issue even a declaratory judgment. The court also found a second reason to 
reverse the trial court’s striking of the cross-complaint in that the claim at 
issue implicated City’s property rights, giving it the right to cross-complain 
under California’s Civil Procedure laws. Accordingly, the appellate court 
reversed the trial court’s decision to strike City’s cross-complaint and 
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its judgment.  
Connecticut 
 
Town of Glastonbury v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 179 A.3d 201 (Conn. 2018). 
 
Non-Member Town (“Town”) sued Water Provider, alleging that Water 
Provider charged Town an illegal surcharge for its services. After the court 
of original jurisdiction found in Town’s favor and granted summary 
judgment, the state legislature passed a bill allowing Water Provider to 
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establish a surcharge on non-member towns, subject to certain limitations. 
Water Provider attempted to dismiss the ruling based on the retroactive 
legislation but the court determined the legislation was not retroactive, and 
therefore did not affect the prior unlawful surcharges. On appeal, Water 
Provider claimed error on the part of the district court determining that 
plaintiff’s claim was not rendered moot by the legislation. The Supreme 
Court of Connecticut determined that the claim was justiciable and that 
Town’s status as non-member town did not disqualify it from bringing the 
suit. Additionally, the Court concluded that prior to enactment of the 
legislation, Water Provider did not have authority to impose the surcharge 




Lemhi Cty. v. Moulton, 414 P.3d 226 (Idaho 2018). 
 
Downhill Landowner (“Downhill”) was in a dispute with Uphill Landowner 
(“Uphill”) as to whether irrigation wastewater could flow across Downhill’s 
property into an adjoining river. This case follows a claim brought 
successfully by County in which it asserted Downhill was blocking the flow 
of Uphill’s irrigation wastewater from reaching the river via a draw on 
Downhill’s property. The blockage caused County’s road to flood. Thus, 
Downhill was forced to allow the flow of wastewater. Subsequently, 
Downhill claimed Uphill sent too much water down the draw and 
challenged Uphill’s ability to send the wastewater across Downhill’s land. 
The lower court found that the draw on Downhill’s property was a natural 
waterway and that Uphill accordingly had a natural servitude and a 
prescriptive easement in which to send a certain volume of wastewater 
across Downhill’s land to the river. Downhill challenged the establishment 
of the easement and the scope of the easement granted. The Supreme Court 
of Idaho held that the lower court correctly found the presence of the 
requisite factors for a prescriptive easement and also held that the scope of 
the easement was appropriate. Downhill also challenged the basis for the 
natural servitude theory, but the court found that the natural basin drainage 
was a natural watercourse in which wastewater could flow, subject to the 
volume limitation set by the lower court. However, the court did find that 
the lower court did not adequately describe the location of the drainage 
basin for the prescriptive easement or natural servitude and the court should 
have better identified the property subject to the easement. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho remanded the case to the district court for 
modification of its previous judgment.  
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Teton Coop. Reservoir Co., 2018 MT 66, 391 Mont. 66, 414 P.3d 1249.   
 
Irrigation Company appealed a decision by a water court. In 1902, 
Irrigation Company filed a Notice of Appropriation claiming 3,000 cubic 
feet per second from the Tenton River for irrigation and claiming of lands. 
A Secondary Irrigation Company later began using portions of water that 
Irrigation Company had claimed. Irrigation Company brought complaints 
regarding the water rights claims of Secondary Irrigation Company, as well 
as a dissatisfied water user complaint because a water commissioner 
reduced its flow to half of that available in the Teton River. The district 
court removed these claims to the state water court. The state water court 
found that the 1902 Notice of Appropriation was valid. However, Irrigation 
Company was barred by the doctrine of laches from claiming senior priority 
of its 1902 notice. Both parties appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Montana upheld the water court’s decision, holding that the water court did 
not err in finding that the 1902 Notice of Appropriation was valid but the 




King v. St. Clair, 414 P.3d 314 (Nev. 2018). 
 
Landowner found an abandoned well on his property and applied for a 
permit requesting to temporarily change the point of diversion from that 
well to another location on Landowner’s property for the water source 
located underground. Upon review, the State Engineer (“Engineer”) denied 
the permit application, finding that although a prior owner had established a 
vested right to the water source, a following owner had abandoned that 
right due to non-use. This finding was overruled by the district court which 
found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate an intent to 
abandon the water ownership right on the part of any previous owner. The 
Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed, holding that Engineer’s finding that 
non-use alone was sufficient to establish an intent to abandon water rights 
was a misapplication of Nevada law. Rather, the party asserting 
abandonment of a water right must prove with clear and convincing 
evidence that Landowner or any prior owners intended to abandon it, which 
was not found here.  
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Gila Res. Info. Project v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm’n, 
2018-MNSC-025, 2018 WL 1192748. 
This case arises out of a compilation of cases in which environmental 
organization and various other parties (“Environmental Organization”) filed 
suit seeking review of Water Control Commission’s (“Commission”) 
enactment of an amendment to the Water Quality Act (“Act”), arguing that 
the amendment actually violated the Act.  The Amendment in question 
provided new regulation for the copper industry. The New Mexico Supreme 
Court held that (1) the regulation was based on a permissible construction 
of the Act because the language, “place of withdrawal,” within the 
regulation did not suggest a categorical bar on the regulation’s containment 
strategy, but rather gave Commission flexibility to implement practices that 
it deemed prudent; (2) the regulation did not permit “widespread 
pollution . . . at open pit copper mine facilities”; (3) even if the regulation 
created a “point of compliance” system, the Act did not prohibit such a 
system; (4) even if the regulation broke from past Commission practice, a 
legislative decision put Environmental Organization on notice that such 
variation was possible, and moreover, Commission was not constrained by 
prior decisions; and (5) Environmental Organization’s contentions that the 
regulation’s closure provisions were improper were baseless. Accordingly, 
the Court determined that the regulation did not violate the Water Quality 
Act and thus affirmed Commission’s adoption of the regulation. 
State ex rel. State Engr. v. United States, No. A-1-CA-33535, 2018 WL 
1616612 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018). 
 
The United States has had an extensive relationship with the Navajo Nation, 
dating back to 1849 when the parties entered into a peace treaty moving the 
Navajo people to eastern New Mexico. A second treaty then moved the 
Navajo Nation to a portion of their ancestral territory as their “permanent 
home.” This tribal movement led to a claim on the part of the tribe 
regarding the water feeding into the San Juan River from the Colorado 
River through the Grand Canyon. In 2005, after a decade of negotiation, the 
claims of the Navajo Nation were settled. State’s legislature then 
appropriated $50,000,000 to pay State’s cost of the settlement agreement 
and brought suit seeking judicial approval regarding State’s share of the 
water. The district court ruled in the affirmative on all counts and approved 
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the settlement. The court rejected all objections by non-settling parties, all 
of whom then appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. Because the 
parties all appealed separately from each other and on more than fifty 
different claims, the appellate court ruled on them categorically. Ultimately, 
the appellate found that the district court’s finding was fair and adequate to 




Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes, 809 S.E.2d 853 (N.C. 2018). 
 
Landowner sued City after City artificially raised the water level of the lake 
on which Landowner owned property, resulting in Landowner losing 
significant amounts of usable land. Landowner alleged that the action 
amounted to a taking of his property for which he was not compensated by 
City. The trial court ruled in favor of Landowner. On appeal, City claimed 
that because the action was not taken in furtherance of public use or 
purpose, Landowner’s claim for inverse condemnation was unjustified. The 
appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding, holding that there can be 
no inverse condemnation when property is not taken for a public use. The 
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision, 
holding that the language of N.C.G.S. §40A-51(a) only specifies which 
entities against whom a statutory inverse claim can be asserted, not the 
purposes for which a claim may be brought. The court remanded the case to 
the appellate court for review of Landowner’s remaining challenges to the 




Ciecko v. Dept. of Land Conservation & Dev., 415 P.3d 1122 (Or. Ct. App. 
2018). 
 
Individuals brought challenge against Conservation Department concerning 
the validity of rule development for part five of the 1994 Territorial Sea 
Plan (“TSP”). The Ocean Policy Advisory Council (“OPAC”) was 
developed in 1991 to assist Conservation Department in managing 
Oregon’s territorial sea. The TSP has since gone through multiple editions 
with the rules being edited to best serve their purpose and protect coastal 
waters. In 2008, OPAC began work on part five of the TSP, proposing and 
discussing different amendments, most of which were focused on 
renewable energy sites and where best to locate them and protect the 
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surrounding area from any negative effects. After extensive discussions 
between OPAC and Conservation Department concerning how best to 
amend the TSP, OPAC proposed multiple amendments, which 
Conservation Department then reviewed and modified before submitting 
the edited TSP. Individuals brought this suit concerning the rule-making 
process, claiming that Conservation Department violated state-based 
statutory rule-making procedures. Individuals alleged that the rules allowed 
for Conservation Department to modify any amendments to the TSP by 
OPAC, but that it must then return them to OPAC for revision. The court 
agreed, and because Conservation Department did not follow this 





StarLink Logistics, Inc. v. ACC, LLC, No. M2014–00362–COA–R3–CV, 
2018 WL 637941 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018). 
 
Property Owner filed claims against Landfill Operator after it was 
discovered that a landfill controlled by Landfill Operator, which primarily 
held aluminum recycling waste, was leaching chloride and ammonia into 
groundwater and surface water of two lakes owned by the Property Owner. 
Landfill Operator and State of Tennessee (“State”) developed a plan to 
remediate and prevent storm water from entering the site. Property Owner 
claimed that the adopted plan was inadequate to prevent leaching of 
pollutants into lakes. Additionally, Property Owner claimed that the 
adopted plan did not provide oversight via a permit under the federal Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”) and rather, would allow for continued contamination 
into the lakes from the landfill site. However, the Court of Appeals of 
Tennessee found that the adopted plan did not allow for infinite pollution 
into the lakes and that the plan was the only cost-effective way of 
remediating the site. Further, Property Owner claimed that the state agency 
involved did not have authority under state law to implement the adopted 
plan, but the court found the state was not obligated to follow federal law 
requiring a permit under the CWA, and instead, state environmental law 









URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cty., 61 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 565 (Tex. 2018).  
 
County sued Company for breach of contract, alleging that a prior 
settlement agreement demanded that Company restore all drinking and 
agricultural waters affected by Company’s mining operation to an 
acceptable quality before mining operations could resume. The lower courts 
found in favor of County by allowing extrinsic evidence at the time of the 
settlement’s execution to prove the intent of the parties. On appeal, the 
Court determined that there was no evidence of “proof” that the water 
quality had returned to consumable quality. Instead, the settlement only 
required a statement from Company’s officer certifying to the judge that 
well restoration was completed before mining could commence. There was 
not any requirement for that assertion to be honest. Therefore, because the 
trial court found that the breach was unintentional and without deliberate 
intent, there was no bad faith on the part with regard to the water quality, 




Brewer v. Lake Easton Homeowners Ass’n, 413 P.3d 16 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2018).  
 
Landowners sued Homeowners Association (“HOA”) over a water systems 
agreement (“Agreement”). In relevant part, the agreement in conjunction 
with the formation of the HOA “delegate[d] their water management 
obligations [instead of taking] them on directly.” This is due, in part, to the 
valid formation of the HOA. The HOA is valid because it meets all three 
requirements of a valid HOA: that it is “[1] a corporation, unincorporated 
association, or other legal entity, each member of which [2] is an owner of 
residential real property located within the association’s jurisdiction, as 
described in the governing documents, and [3] by virtue of membership or 
ownership of property is obligated to pay real property taxes, insurance 
premiums, maintenance costs, or for improvement of real property other 
than that which is owned by the member.” Consequently, assessments were 
properly paid to the HOA. 
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Chelan Basin Conservancy v. GBI Holding Co., 413 P.3d 549 (Wash. 
2018). 
 
Conservation Organization sued Landfill Owner, alleging that Landfill 
Owner’s fill of a dam built in 1927 raised property elevation and obstructed 
the public right to use navigable waters. Company argued that the State of 
Washington’s RCS 90.58.270 (“Savings Clause”), which protected 
legislative consent to projects built before 1967 that violate public water 
rights, barred the action. Conservation Organization disagreed, arguing that 
the dam violated the public nuisance statute of the state, which was enacted 
prior to the Savings Clause. The court ruled in favor of Landfill Owner, 
holding that the Savings Clause’s purpose was to protect all such project 
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS 
 




Johnson v. APJ Props., LLC, No. 17-1970, 2018 WL 1633467 (6th Cir. 
Apr. 5, 2018). 
 
Landowner sued Property Company (“Company”), alleging that Company 
overburdened its prescriptive easement over Landowner’s property by 
acquiring an additional parcel adjacent to Landowner’s property and 
erecting a boathouse and other additions. Landowner argued that the 
improvements exceeded the easement’s historical scope. The district court 
denied Landowner’s request for an injunction, and the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed, holding that there is no per se overburdening of an 
easement by the addition of land to a dominant estate. Rather, the appellate 
court ruled that only an increase in the actual use of an easement may 




Montana Mine Land Holdings, LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., CV 17-65-H-
CCL, 2018 WL 1640866 (D. Mont. Apr. 5, 2018). 
 
Mining Company held patented mining claims in the Helena-Lewis and 
Clark National Forest. Two of the claims are served by a closed private 
road under the 2005 North Belts Travel Plan (“Travel Plan”). According to 
the Travel Plan, parties to the mining claims must apply for a special use 
permit to access the road. Mining Company challenged this requirement, 
asserting that it was entitled to use of the road by right of way conferred 
upon the claims by the General Mining Act of 1872 before the national 
forest was established. Mining Company sought declaratory judgment that 
Federal Government cannot require the special use permit. The court, 
however, determined that easements across federal lands are different than 
those on private lands and that a drawing of a road on a patent document 
does not provide an easement. The court also found that a grant of easement 
by the United States must be expressed. Because there was no expressed 
reference whatsoever on any document provided by Mining Company, the 
court determined that Federal Government can require Plaintiffs to obtain a 
special use permit for access to the private road.  
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Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 776 (N.D. 
Ohio Feb. 14, 2018).  
 
Landowners brought suit against Gas Company alleging both trespass and 
unjust enrichment claims, asserting that Gas Company unlawfully stored 
gas underneath Landowner’s property before proper acquisition of rights to 
the property occurred through eminent domain. The issues presented to the 
court were: (1) whether Gas Company’s acts constituted trespass by storing 
gas on Landowner’s property without first condemning gas storage 
easements by eminent domain; and (2) whether the aforementioned conduct 
unjustly enriched Gas Company. The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio granted Gas Company’s motion for summary 
judgment regarding trespass finding that (1) Gas Company’s failure to 
pursue gas storage easements did not automatically invalidate its certificate 
allowing gas storage; (2) Gas Company did not trespass because 
Landowners could not meet their burden of proving that there was any 
physical harm to their properties or any present or reasonably foreseeable 
interference with the use of their respective properties; (3) Landowners did 
not have standing to recover for unjust enrichment; and (4) Landowners are 
not entitled to punitive damages because there was no evidence of actual 
malice.  
 
Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, No. 5:17CV2062, 2018 
WL 1638647 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2018).  
 
Producers of a pipeline (“Producer”) sought preliminary injunction against 
Landowners to access property owned by Landowners. The trial court 
analyzed Producer’s motion for preliminary injunction by considering the 4 
factors: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm to 
movant, (3) whether injunction would cause substantial harm to others, and 
(4) whether public interest would be served by injunction.  The court found 
that Producer had already met its burden for proof of success on the merits 
on a summary judgment motion on the issue of condemnation. 
Additionally, Producer submitted evidence showing it would incur roughly 
$530,000 in losses if the property at issue was skipped in production of the 
pipeline, due to Producer’s ongoing schedule. Landowners claimed that 
they would suffer harm because the trees and soil on their land would be 
destroyed. However, because Producer had access to the land through 
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eminent domain, landowners would be compensated for any harm to their 
property. Lastly, Producer claimed the pipeline is in the public interest 
because it was being installed to ensure consumers would have access to 
natural gas at reasonable prices. The court found in favor of Producer on all 
factors and subsequently granted the preliminary injunction, permitting 
Producer access to easement on Landowners’ property. Please note that an 




Panhandle E. Pipe Line, Co., L.P. v. Plummer, No. 1:16-cv-02288-JMS-
DLP, 2018 WL 1505013 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2018). 
 
Pipeline Owner brought suit against Landowners for failure to remove 
obstructions for right-of-way easement, as required by an agreement 
concerning the easement between the two parties. Pipeline Owner sought an 
injunction prohibiting Landowner from interfering with access to the right-
of-way easement as well as damages. Landowners counterclaimed that 
Pipeline Owners had abandoned the pipeline subject to their agreement and 
thus were not entitled to access to the easement. Both parties moved for 
summary judgment. At trial, Landowners conceded that they had released 
their abandonment claim in a previous agreement between the parties and 
thus agreed summary judgment was proper with regards to that claim.  The 
court, however, also granted Pipeline Owner’s summary judgment motion 
on the injunction after finding that all 4 factors considered for an injunction 
weighed in favor of Pipeline Owner’s. Additionally, the court found that 
Pipeline Owner had shown sufficient evidence proving it had suffered 
$6,000 in damages as a result of mobilization and demobilization fees it 
paid to clear the Property. Finally, the court found that in addition to the 
$6,000 in damages, Pipeline Owner was also entitled to attorney’s fees and 
costs, pursuant to the terms of the prior agreement between the parties.  
 
S.D. West Virginia 
 
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. An Easement to Construct, Operate & 
Maintain a 42-inch Gas Transmission Line, No. 2:17-cv-04214, 2018 WL 
1004745 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 21, 2018).  
 
Company filed a partial motion for summary judgment and easement access 
against Landowners, who also filed motions to dismiss and a motion to stay 
proceedings. Company claimed power of eminent domain against 
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Landowners through the authority of the Natural Gas Act and the Federal 
Energy and Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and asserted that authority 
after attempting to obtain the easements, which are required for Company’s 
pipeline project, through negotiations with Landowner. Landowners 
claimed that the court possessed the authority to review and approve the 
stay, but the court disagreed, holding instead that Landowners’ challenges 
may not be heard by the court because such eminent domain authority is 
given by FERC and such review should be part of the condemnation 
process. Accordingly, the court denied Landowners’ motions. The court 
granted Company’s motion to strike and motion for a preliminary 
injunction because Company was acting with the power of eminent domain, 
and its actions were deemed to be in the public interest. Additionally, the 
court held that Company’s eminent domain activity may not be stayed, 
except by an appeal court or FERC, without creating significant harm; 
therefore, the preliminary injunction was appropriate. Please note that this 
case has been appealed and is pending in the 4th Circuit. 
 




Hubbard v. Cason, 2160473, 2018 WL 670470 (Ala. Civ. App. Feb. 2, 
2018). 
 
Landowner-1 filed a trespass suit against Landower-2 after a dispute 
regarding ownership of a roadway that was used to access each owner’s 
property. Landowner-1 claimed he was the owner of the roadway either by 
deed or adverse possession. Landower-2 claimed that Landower-1 was 
granted a right-of-way in the roadway and that he, Landowner-2, owned the 
land subject to Landower-2’s easement in the roadway. The trial court 
found that Landower-1, based on grant, and Landowner-2, based on adverse 
possession, only had an easement in the roadway and the underlying 
property was owned by a third landowner. On appeal, the Court of Civil 
Appeals of Alabama reviewed past deeds and treatment of the property in 
order to determine who owned rights in the roadway. The court held that 
the deed, which originally granted the property now owned by Landower-1, 
only granted an easement in the roadway. Therefore Landower-1 could not 
own the roadway outright and only held an easement therein. Landower-1 
also claimed on appeal that Landower-2 failed to adequately satisfy adverse 
possession in the roadway. After analysis of adverse possession, the 
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appellate court also held that Landower-2 properly satisfied the 




Peregrine Trading, LLC v. Rowe, 2018 Ark. App. 176, 2017 WL 1178183. 
 
Company sued Landowner, alleging that Landowner committed trespass 
when his sewage line ran underneath Company’s adjoining property and 
leaked sewage into the ground. Trial court granted a directed verdict for 
Landowner, holding that Company was made aware by the presence of the 
sewage line for the statutory period necessary to establish a prescriptive 
easement. The appellate court affirmed, holding that because the line had 
been installed in 1993 and because portions of the line were visible from 
above the ground, a reasonable inspection by Company would have put 
Company on notice of the presence of the lines. Additionally, because 
Landowner diligently inspected his sewage line, the appellate court upheld 





CAW Equities, L.L.C. v. City of Greenwood Vill., 2018 COA 42M, No. 
17CA0212, 2018 WL 1417920. 
 
Landowner sued City, alleging that City’s proposed public walkway 
through Landowner’s property was an unauthorized exercise of eminent 
domain. Landowner argued that Colorado Const. art. XVI, § 7 (“§7”), 
which allows for private condemnation of public projects if ditches and 
culverts are necessary, is self-executing and that Landowner did not need to 
show any injury in order to privately condemn such projects that interfere 
with private ditches that allow for the flow of water. The court disagreed, 
holding that §7 was not self-executing and may be regulated by eminent 
domain statutes. To hold otherwise, the court explained, would allow 
private property owners an unfettered ability to condemn property without 
any guiding principles. Furthermore, so long as City could build its trail 
without extinguishing Landowner’s prior public use of the ditch, no 
exigency existed which required the condemnation of the trail project. 
Therefore, Landowner lacked the legal authority to condemn City’s public 
trail, and his claim was dismissed. 
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LaFave v. McCaleb, No.336004, 2018 WL 662267 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 
2018). 
 
Property Owners appealed trial court’s ruling that they had abandoned their 
easement interests, disputing an undeveloped roadway’s use and claiming 
that they used it multiple times per year and that they hoped to develop the 
roadway further. The roadway was not necessary to access any of the 
surrounding properties as Property Owners used an alternate, developed 
roadway. The Court of Appeals of Michigan analyzed the roadway’s use 
and found that Property Owner had abandoned any easement interest in the 
land underlying the undeveloped roadway for the following reasons: (1) 
Property Owner did not use the roadway; (2) there were numerous 
impairments preventing public use of the roadway; and (3) there was an 
alternate roadway that could be used to access the properties. Therefore, 
Property Owner had abandoned any easement interests in the roadway, 




Regency Lake Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Regency Lake, LLC, No. COA17–
1117, 2018 WL 1597712 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018). 
 
Landowners’ Association brought suit for declaratory judgment seeking (1) 
a declaration that Landowners on the property had a private easement on 
the area and (2) an injunction preventing Development Company from 
altering or restricting access to the easement. The area in which the 
easement is located is owned by Development Company. The trial court 
granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Landowners’ Association and 
ordered that all remaining owners of property in the area be joined as 
parties to the action. Landowners’ Association appealed the court’s order 
for joinder. On review of the interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals of 
North Carolina reviewed whether the order itself affected a substantial right 
of the Landowners’ Association sufficiently to warrant the interlocutory 
appeal. Landowners’ Association argued that the order's requirement to join 
other landowners in the area deprived it of a substantial right by eliminating 
its individual property rights and replacing these rights with a group 
property right, which it claimed only exists when exercised along with other 
Landowners. The Appellate Court found that Landowners’ Association 
failed to prove a substantial right to seek declaratory relief, without joinder 
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of other necessary parties who had claims and interests in the property at 
issue that would be effected by the court’s order. Thus, the court found that 
the order of the trial court did not effect a substantial right of Landowner’s 




City of Richardson v. Oncor Elec. Delivery, 539 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. 2018). 
 
This case set out to determine whether Electric Distributor (“Utility”) or 
City was responsible for payments associated with electric utility 
infrastructure relocation of utility poles, wires, and related equipment, after 
the widening of a public alleyways. Parties filed suit against one another in 
response to City’s request that Utility move its infrastructure, at its own 
expense, after widening of City’s alleyway. Under Texas statutory and 
common law, utilities must bear relocation or removal costs of any 
equipment placed in public rights-of-way upon the reasonable request of the 
municipality. Additionally, this requirement was incorporated into the 
contract between Utility and City. However, Utility argued that a newly 
adopted tariff – a schedule of the utility containing rates, regulations, and 
other items concerning the relationship with its customers – relieved Utility 
from its duty to pay relocation costs. The Supreme Court of Texas found 
that (1) the contract between Utility and City governed when a municipality 
requests utility relocation for public rights-of-way purposes, and 
alternatively (2) the tariff would govern when the municipality was acting 
as an end-use customer in its request. Therefore, in this case, common and 
statutory law would be controlling, and Utility would be responsible for the 
relocation costs of the electric utility infrastructure.  
 
XTO Energy, Inc. v. EOG Res., Inc., No. 04–17–00046–CV, 2018 WL 
1610940 (Tex. App. Apr. 4, 2018).  
 
In a title dispute over a mineral estate, Producer sought a declaration of 
ownership over Landowners. The dispute arose regarding a clause in the 
deed granting title to Landowners, which authorized grantor to convey title 
to the 7/8 mineral interest free and clear of a Lien and Deed of Trust lien to 
Landowners. Producer filed a trespass-to-try title suit against Landowners 
claiming that it owned the full mineral interest pursuant to the Deed. At 
trial, the lower court found that according to the chain of title, all of the 
rights and interest in the mineral estate belonged to Landowners and their 
predecessors-in-interest. Producer appealed claiming Landowners failed to 
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carry their burden for summary judgment to establish superior title to the 
Mineral Estate and that it had carried its own burden in showing its 
ownership of the Mineral Estate. The parties presented competing 
interpretations of the clause in the deed at issue. The appellate court chose 
to look at the plain language of the clause in its interpretation. Based on the 
four corners and the plain language of the deed, the court ruled that the 
Landowners were in fact the owners of the mineral estate, and the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment.  
 




M.L. Johnson Family Props., LLC v. Zinke, No. 7:16–CV–6–KKC, 2018 
WL 1413380 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2018).  
 
This case arises out of a dispute between common owners regarding 
whether their collectively held property should be opened up for mining. 
Owner-1 requested judicial review, bringing this challenge of the 
administrative decision in favor of Owner-2, effectively terminating a 
mining cessation order and allow mining activity on the property. The 
“right to enter and surface mine” was conveyed under the authority of the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, which requires that the 
mining operations must be agreed to by owners or be consistent with 
relevant state law. Owner-2 claimed that this regulation allowed the mining 
activity to be valid even without all consent because of the applicability of 
state co-tenancy laws, since the mining regulations “should not be 
interpreted as preempting common law rights of entry.” The court affirmed 
the administrative decision to allow the mining permit and activity, using 
the Chevron test for deference to the administrative agency, essentially 
determining that the relevant statute was not ambiguous and the agency’s 
actions were not unreasonable. The court denied Owner-1’s motion for 
summary judgment and granted cross-motions for summary judgment filed 
by mining company and by the reviewing administrative department in 










Waverley View Inv’rs, LLC v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 593 (Fed. Cl. 
2018). 
 
Landowner sued United States, claiming that Army affected a permanent 
physical taking of Landowner’s property when it installed a gravel access 
well and monitoring wells. The trial court determined that Landowner was 
entitled to $1.06 per square foot of the property physically occupied by 
Army, but neither party could provide the court with an estimate of the 
area. Landowner claimed that Army occupied 53,353 square feet of the 
property, while Army claimed that it occupied only 29,928 square feet. 
However, the court determined that because Army failed to include a 
twenty-five foot “buffer zone” to allow for maneuverability and routine use 
in their calculations, Landowner’s calculation was proper, and that 
calculation of property occupied by Army was the proper measurement. 
Please note, an appeal has since been filed by Landowner to the Federal 
Circuit.  
 
N.D. California  
 
State v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018).  
 
State opposed Agency’s action suspending or relaxing its regulations on 
natural gas waste management and conservation and seeking a preliminary 
injunction. Intervenors and Agency requested a transfer to District of 
Wyoming because of a related case in that jurisdiction. However, the court 
here stated that the claims were too different, involving separate legal 
issues, even though the subject rules were somewhat correlated. Agency did 
not show that the transfer would be best overall and clearly in its favor, 
which it must do to effectively request transfer. Convenience for all parties 
involved is still a dominant factor considered, even when the cases are 
directly related. Further, it was not imperative for the “interests of justice” 
that the case be reviewed along with the case regarding the underlying 
regulation in Wyoming. The court held that Agency must have some 
legitimate justification for the suspension rule and the change in its 
regulations. The court held that such changes cannot be inconsistent with 
the general scheme of regulations without some good reason. The court also 
found that there was no evidence that the original rule negatively impacted 
the energy sector or had other significant negative effects, so the suspension 
rule was not well-supported as a necessary measure. The court offered that, 
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in this case, it was not tasked with reviewing the underlying rule, rather, 
merely whether the change in rules was justified by Agency. The court 
granted State’s request for a preliminary injunction due to the high 
likelihood that State would win its challenge, because Agency’s action was 
not significantly supported with good evidence. Also, the court held that 
State suffered “irreparable injury caused by the waste of publicly owned 
natural gas, increased air pollution and associated health impacts, and 
exacerbated climate impacts.” Therefore, the court determined that State 
would continue to suffer additional harm via “significant and imminent” air 
pollution if the preliminary injunction was not granted.  
 
N.D. New York 
 
Cooper Crouse-Hinds, LLC v. City of Syracuse, No. 16-CV-1201 
(MAD/ATB), 2018 WL 840056 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018). 
 
Companies (“Company”) sued City and County over two consent orders 
regarding company’s landfill site (“Site”). Company sought relief under 
CERCLA and several state law claims, and City moved to dismiss. The 
district court found that Company may proceed under section 107 of 
CERCLA regarding one consent order “[b]ecause [it] does not resolve 
[company’s] liability.” As for another consent order in which liability is 
conditioned upon a “certificate of completion,” the Second Circuit has not 
resolved that issue and district courts have split as to whether conditional 
liability will allow a party to go forward under section 113(f)(3)(B). The 
court did not decide that issue considering the parties did not sufficiently 
brief it. As for the state law claims, all but one were dismissed for “failure 
to comply with the relevant notice-of-claim requirements.” Company’s 
claim for breach of contract against County survive the motion to dismiss, 
however, because it is timely and not preempted by CERCLA considering 
the CERCLA issues are still unresolved. 
 




Citizens for Open & Pub. Participation v. City of Montebello, B277060, 
2018 WL 636250 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2018). 
 
Advocacy Group (“Advocate”) claimed that City improperly approved and 
enabled development of a residential real estate project. Specifically, 
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Advocate challenged the trial court’s finding (1) that City did not violate 
the Ralph M. Brown Act or local planning and zoning laws and (2) that the 
court abused its discretion in striking portions of Advocate’s brief as 
outside the scope of its claims. The California appellate court began by 
reviewing the brief’s claims and held that the trial court was properly within 
its authority to exclude portions of Advocate’s brief. Next the court 
analyzed the Brown Act which places public notice requirements on local 
agencies regarding the project being considered for approval before a 
meeting is held. Advocate claimed that notice was properly given to the 
public via paper notice but that the location of meeting was mistakenly 
listed on City’s website. The appellate court held that City had complied 
with the act and that the mistake was not prejudicial. Lastly, the court 
addressed whether the approved project was outside of the general plan of 
City’s planning and zoning laws. However, the court held that the project 
was not inconsistent with City’s general housing plan. Please note that this 
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court rules 




Pelican Creek Homeowners, LLC v. Pulverenti, No. 5D16–4046, 2018 WL 
664239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2018).  
 
Property Owners appeal the denial of an injunction seeking to remove Dock 
Owners’ boathouse and dock from their property. The dispute arises from a 
dedication in 1960 by the property developers. To determine who owns the 
property, the court had to determine three issues: (1) was the dedication a 
common law dedication or a statutory dedication, (2) did the developer 
reserve the land to itself in the dedication, and (3) how much land was 
subject to the dedication. The court concluded that the dedication was a 
common law dedication because the dedication itself did not reference the 
state statute governing statutory dedications and the parties did not intend to 
form a statutory dedication. The court then concluded that the developer did 
not reserve the land to itself because it was not clearly provided in the 
dedication and the general rule is that a dedication does not reserve any 
rights to the conveyor unless expressly stated in the dedication. Finally, the 
court concluded that all of the land is subject to the dedication and therefore 
the Property Owners own the property dedicated in the conveyance. The 
general rule is that abutting land owners each receive half of the property 
dedicated. However, the exception to this rule is where the dedication is of 
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land at the edge of the plat, which is applicable here. Under the exception, 




St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., 2017-
0434 (La. 1/30/18); 239 So. 3d 243. 
Port Authority selected Land Owner’s property for expropriation in order to 
facilitate expansion. Land Owner removed the expropriation case to a 
federal court, which rejected Land Owner’s request for dismissal and found 
in favor of Port Authority on the ultimate purchase price for the land. An 
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, and Land Owner appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The Court affirmed in part, holding that 
nothing in the record indicated that the trial court was “manifestly 
erroneous” in its findings that Port Authority’s intended use of the property 
(1) qualified as a “Public Purpose,” as the state constitutionally required for 
such a taking, and (2) qualified under the “business enterprise clause,” and 
was neither to halt Land Owner’s revenue stream nor halt its competition. 
The Court also held though that the trial court used the wrong standard in 
evaluating Property Owner’s claim that the land was not valuated under the 
proper presumption that the land would be used to its “highest and best 
use.” The Court also held that the appellate court’s failure to use a de novo 
standard of review on the issue exacerbated the error. Accordingly, the 
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the case for a proper 
determination on the question of what amount would constitute just 
compensation in this case.  
Nebraska 
 
Cain v. Custer Cty Bd. of Equalization, 906 N.W.2d 285 (Neb. 2018). 
County Assessor (“Assessor”) raised the value of Property Owner’s 
property, increasing the property tax by nearly 250 percent, primarily due to 
Assessor’s re-classification of the property away from “irrigated grassland.” 
Property Owner protested the assessment due to the fact that he had not 
been granted an evidentiary hearing before the County Board of 
Equalization. Property Owner petitioned Tax Equalization and Review 
Commission (“TERC”), which affirmed Assessor’s increased evaluations. 
Property Owner appealed, resulting in a finding of plain error and reversal, 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss1/8
2018]        Recent Case Decisions 179 
  
 
remanding the case to the TERC, which then issued a new order reversing 
Assessor’s evaluations for three of the ten parcels of property in question, 
but once again affirming the other seven parcels. Property Owner appealed 
once more. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that: (1) Property Owner’s 
due process rights were not violated because there is no due process right to 
oral argument specifically; (2) TERC’s decision to disregard Property 
Owner’s testimony—and that of a real estate appraiser—as evidence in its 
determination resulted in an erroneous evidentiary standard being followed; 
and (3) that Property Owner satisfied his burden to show “by a 
preponderance of the evidence” that Assessor’s valuation was excessive. 
The Court also held that a lower number was appropriate, providing the 
total valuation of Property Owner’s land. Based on these holdings, the 




Rapisardi v. Lange, No. A–3722–16T2, 2018 WL 1473918 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Mar. 27, 2018). 
 
Landowner-1 sued Landowner-2 for trespass, alleging that Landowner-2’s 
boat ramp that extended over Landowner-1’s small strip of land violated his 
riparian rights. Landowner-2 argued that while the ramp did extend over 
that small strip of land, it was irrelevant because the land was completely 
submerged under water and below the mean high-water mark of the creek. 
The trial court held that the small strip of submerged land was granted to 
Landowner-1 by the State and was a riparian grant, rather than a riparian 
right. Therefore, Landowner-1 did not possess the exclusive right to use 
that land. The appellate court affirmed, explaining that there is a difference 
between a riparian right and a riparian grant, which is a separate estate in 
land. Landowner-1 lost title to the small strip of land once it became 
submerged below the mean high-water mark, and can therefore not restrict 
access to the creek from Landowner-2’s property. Please note that this is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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Wendt v. Dickerson, 2018-Ohio-1034, No. 2017 AP 08 0024, 2018 WL 
1391624. 
 
Surface Owner initially brought a claim against Mineral Owner, asserting 
its rights to all severed mineral interest in the subject property. Surface 
Owner appealed a lower court decision denying its motion for summary 
judgment against Mineral Owner, which was brought after significant legal 
history regarding this issue between the two parties. Surface Owner 
attempted to gain mineral rights through the state’s Dormant Mineral Act, 
asserting that its mineral interest in the property had vested through the 
inaction of Mineral Owners. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision 
to deny Surface Owner’s motion for summary judgment, determining that 
Mineral Owner had taken appropriate steps in accordance with the relevant 
state laws to assert and protect its mineral interest in the subject property. 
Accordingly, such property was not determined to be judicially abandoned. 
The court also disagreed with Surface Owner’s claim that a potential 
dormant mineral interest was a vested property interest and held that such 




Harakas Constr., Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., No. 
M2016–01540–COA–R–CV, 2018 WL 583919 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 
2018). 
Construction Company (“Company”) filed suit against Local Government 
and Developer after all three parties’ work on a sewer line project for a 
local condominium project led Company to miss out on promised payment 
from the project. The trial court granted motions for summary judgment by 
both Local Government and Developer, holding that Local Government had 
sovereign immunity and was thus precluded from the suit, and that the suit 
against Developer was insufficient because (1) Developer had shown that 
its operations met the standard of care required for the work performed, and 
(2) Company’s negligence allegation against Developer was not the 
proximate cause of any harm to Company, because all harm in question was 
caused by the original financer of the project filing for bankruptcy. In 
response, Company appealed the dismissal of both claims. The Court of 
Appeals of Tennessee held that: (1) no exception existed which erased or 
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caused Local Government’s sovereign immunity to be waived in this case; 
(2) because no statement was made which Company could have 
detrimentally relied on, Government was not estopped from using such a 
defense; and (3) because the evidence in the record supported the trial 
court’s decision, there was no error in the granting of summary judgment to 
Developer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decisions of the trial court. 
Texas 
Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC, No. 01-17-00140-CV, 2018 WL 1003540 
(Tex. App. Feb. 22, 2018). 
 
Landowner sued Texas Land Commission (“Commission”), alleging 
ownership of the bed of a bayou on their property. Commissioner had 
previously determined that the beds of tidally influenced watercourses were 
owned by Texas and subject to public use. Landowner argued that the 
Commission had attempted to “cloud” or “impair” its title by claiming state 
ownership and was interfering with Landowner's right to possession and 
quiet enjoyment of the property by encouraging public use of the contested 
waterways. Because the court found supporting state law on "watercourse 
or navigable stream" as not excluding water that is "tidally affected," the 
court found that the non-conveyance of land influenced by State-owned 
water deprived Landowner. 
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New Energy Econ., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Reg. Comm’n, No. S-1-SC-
35697, 2018 WL 1149928 (N.M. Mar. 5, 2018). 
 
The Public Service Company of New Mexico (“PNM”) is part-owner and 
operator of the San Juan Regional Generation Station (“San Juan Plant”). 
The San Juan Plant consists of four coal-powered units and is subject to 
large production of emissions that cause or contribute to haze. PNM held 
multiple hearings and discussions with the New Mexico Governor and 
other interested parties to determine the best way for PNM to comply with 
the Federal Clean Air Act. Meeting participants determined that the best 
way to do so was to retire two of the units at the San Juan Plant. 
Regulatory Commission rejected this plan because PNM could not 
produce evidence of capability of replacing the lost production from the 
two retired units. After hiring a hearing examiner to address the merits of 
the application for shutting down the units and submitting multiple 
supplemental stipulations, the hearing examiner advised Regulatory 
Commission to accept the application subject to multiple additional 
stipulations. Energy Advocate objected multiple times throughout the 
process, alleging that Regulatory Commission accepted PNM’s limited 
alternatives in violation of the law and challenged the final decision in the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico. The Court ultimately held that 
Regulatory Commission comprehensively considered the merits of PNM’s 
proposals during multiple different stipulation proceedings and that its 
decision to support the proposal and dismiss the protests against it was 
lawful. 
 




SPower Dev. Co. v. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. 17–cv–00683–
CMA–NYW, 2018 WL 1014142 (D. Colo. Feb. 22, 2018).  
 
Company filed claims for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, 
claiming that it was restricted from contracting its quality facilities (“QF”) 
with a utility without a specific bidding process, which is in conflict with 
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the Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) regulations 
on such activity. Commission filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that 
since Company had an opportunity to participate in electronic resource 
planning (“ERP”), which would have allowed it to contract with utilities 
outside of a bidding process, its challenge to the regulation was not 
substantiated with a legitimate injury. Therefore, it had no standing to 
bring a claim. The court disagreed with this argument, stating that it was 
irrelevant whether or not Company could participate in ERP, since it still 
suffered an injury, which was caused by Commission’s action. The court 
also addressed the argument that it should take a “Burford abstention,” 
essentially leaving complicated state-related matters to state courts. The 
court held that a situation calling for such an abstention is rare and not 
relevant for this case because this case involved preemption of federal 
rules and was thus appropriate for a federal court. The court accordingly 
denied Commission’s Motion to Dismiss.   
 




SolarCity Corp. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 413 P.3d 678 (Ariz. 2018). 
 
Solar Producer sued State, seeking tax-friendly treatment on solar panels 
installed on the properties of Solar Producer's customers. Because the 
solar panels are considered to have no value under the relevant tax code, 
Solar Producer argued that the equipment should be assessed as having 
"zero value". The Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that State's 
department of revenue does not have the statutory authority to value Solar 
Producer's panels and, therefore, remanded the case to the lower court to 
determine whether county assessors possess the valuation authority. The 
court found that because Solar Producer profited through leasing the 
panels to its customers, the panels should be valued under the tax code's 




Dan's Mountain Wind Force, LLC v. Allegany Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 
2018 WL 774760 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018).  
 
Constructor seeking to build wind turbines on leased property applied for 
variances and special exceptions from the Board of Zoning (“Board”) 
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because the areas in which it desired to construct the turbines were within 
separation distances. Board denied the request for variances citing that 
Constructor failed to show the areas of land were sufficiently unique to 
each other that the multiple number of variances requested were in 
harmony with the spirit and intent of the zoning regulations, as required 
by state law for the issuance of a variance. Constructor appealed this 
denial of variances to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. The 
appellate court found that Board applied the incorrect standard in 
reviewing Constructor’s application. It held that Board improperly found 
that the areas were not unique because they were similar to each other. 
Because Board failed to apply the proper standards and analysis for the 
variance application, the appellate court remanded the case back to Board 
to apply the proper analyses without making any decisions on the merits 
of the case. Please note that this is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, state or federal court rules should be consulted before citing the 




Napier v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., A–4408–15T2, 2018 WL 1308868 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 14, 2018).  
 
Complainant filed a claim asserting that Company was receiving more 
renewable energy credits than it should be, based on its own formula for 
calculations. Complainant also claimed that Company failed to comply 
with regulations regarding energy reporting. These claims were brought 
on behalf of a group, with Complainant as an interested party. The claims, 
based on “unfair competition and unjust enrichment,” were brought due to 
the negative economic impact caused by the undervaluing of such credits, 
which was a result of Company’s actions. Upon review, the ALJ 
determined that there was “no issue of material fact” and granted 
Company’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the trial court 
granted a motion to dismiss brought by Company, because Complainant 
did not bring a claim that could be granted relief. The court also agreed 
with the lower court that Complainant’s discovery requests were not 
necessary and could be denied because Company had already responded 
adequately. First, the court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s decision 
because (1) Board did approve the method of calculation and 
measurement of the credits, and (2) such methods were in accordance 
with Board’s regulations, despite Complainant’s assertion to the contrary. 
The court determined that when Board approved Company’s metering 
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program, it, in effect, allowed and approved such methods. Second, even 
though Complainant claimed that Company failed to show that 
Complainant did not present a genuine issue of fact, the burden to be met 
was not assigned to Company. Though the court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, it also designated the dismissal to be without prejudice, 
so that Complainant could bring potential future meritorious claims. 
Please note that this is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, 





Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 810 S.E.2d 880 (Va. 
2018). 
 
Service Provider filed suit with the State Corporation Commission 
seeking declaratory judgment order asserting its right to sell electricity 
provided from renewable energy to large customers within the operating 
territory of Public Service Company authorized by the state to provide 
electricity. Normally, large customers would be subject to five-years' 
advance notice requirement if they wished to return to Public Service 
Company. The State Corporation Commission determined that large 
customers could purchase electricity provided from renewable energy 
from competitive service provider without being subject to notice 
requirement. Public Service Company appealed. The Supreme Court of 
Virginia affirmed the order of the State Corporation Commission, holding 
that certain large customers may purchase electricity from any licensed 
supplier of energy in the state without being subject to the statutory notice 
requirement. It found that customers who satisfy the size requirements of 
the statutory definition of “large” could purchase electricity from a 
competitive service provider under section (A)(5), so long as they 
satisfied other requirements under the statute. However, the 5-year notice 
requirement doesn’t apply to purchases of electric energy provided by 
renewable energy from competitive providers.  
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Rates – Federal  
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
Nw. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 884 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 
2018).  
 
Utility requested review of Federal Energy Regulation Commission’s 
(“FERC”) order requiring that Utility revise their framework for charges 
to customers, and determining that such charges were “not just and 
reasonable.” Commission allows utilities to charge utility customers 
additional rates to compensate for extra energy production and used to 
balance electricity demands, called “regulation service.” However, while 
charges for this additional power produced are allowed to be charged 
generally to customers, they still must be “just and reasonable.” After 
struggling to meet demand while still maintaining cost efficiency, Utility 
constructed a new facility to generate additional power and make 
“regulation service” more effective. Utility attempted to transfer the costs 
of this new facility to its customers in the same way that it had the 
previous regulation costs. Commission found Utility’s modifications to its 
rates, which imposed these additional costs, to be unreasonable and 
required it to compensate its customers for these charges. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that this was an 
“overcollection” case rather than a “cost-allocation” case, as Utility 
asserted, which made a difference in what precedent was applied and 
whether a refund was appropriate. Thus, the court held in favor of 
Commission, finding Commission’s decision “reasonable and reasonably 
explained.”   
 




Freeport Minerals Corp. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, No. 2 CA-CC 2017-
0001, 2018 WL 1633287 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2018). 
 
Electric utility service provider (“Utility”) filed a notice of intent to 
change its rates in 2015 to increase its return on invested capital. Many 
government bodies, advocacy groups, and corporations intervened, and 
multiple settlement discussions followed. Over the process of settlement, 
Utility agreed to lower the total revenue increase it sought. However, 
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nothing was changed concerning allocation among rate classes. Upon 
review of the revenue allocation, the Arizona Corporation Commission 
(“Commission”) adopted a nearly identical allocation scheme as was 
proposed by Utility despite challenges and objections by Oil Company 
and others. Subject to Commission’s decision, Oil Company requested 
review challenging alleged constitutional and statutory violations of the 
allocation portion of the decision. Oil Company also proposed alternative 
rate allocations. However, on appeal, the court determined that 
Commission was empowered by the Arizona Constitution to have sole 
discretion in rate allocation. The appellate court also concluded that Oil 
Company failed to clearly demonstrate that Commission’s decision was 
arbitrary, unlawful, or lacked substantial evidence. Thus, the court 
accordingly affirmed the lower court’s ruling. 
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
Bankruptcy 
 
S.D. Texas  
 
Oklahoma State Treasurer v. Linn Operating Inc., No. 6:17-CV-0066, 2018 
WL 1535354 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018). 
 
Operator voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 relief in Bankruptcy Court. 
Operator, in its application, requested that claims of owners of 
approximately $1,000,000 in unclaimed royalties held by Operator would 
be discharged upon confirmation of the plan and thus Operator would hold 
on to royalties. The bankruptcy court approved the plan, but the State 
Treasurer filed an adverse action seeking proof of claims against Operator 
seeking possession of all unclaimed royalties, specifically $965,000 in oil 
and gas production proceeds it characterized as abandoned property. The 
bankruptcy court dismissed Treasurer’s complaint after finding that the 
claim was merely a post-confirmation collateral attack on the debtor’s plan. 
Treasurer appealed the dismissal of the claim to the Southern District of 
Texas. On appeal, the court reversed the lower court and ruled that the 
unclaimed oil and gas royalties were held in trust by Operator for the 
Landowners. Thus, the unclaimed royalties were never property of Operator 
and were not properties subject to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction or to 






Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 881 F.3d 894 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
Automobile Technology Company (“Tech Company”) filed suit against 
Automobile Manufacturer (“Manufacturer”) for patent infringement on 
several different patents for “hybrid vehicle technology.” Automobile 
Manufacturer then filed several inter partes review petitions, which were 
reviewed by Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), which invalidated 
several of Company’s claims as obvious and unpatentable. Company 
appealed. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that: (1) PTAB’s 
finding that a previously issued patent rendered several of Tech Company’s 
claims obvious was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) a previous 
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publication, which qualified nominally as “prior art” to the patents at issue 
in this case, was not actually prior art based on the language included in the 
text of a previous application by parties to this case; thus, (3) the patents 
invalidated by PTAB based on that previous publication were cast aside 
incorrectly. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed PTAB’s 
determinations on thirteen of the patent’s claims, and vacated Board’s 
determination on six claims, remanding the case for further proceedings 
consistent with the court’s holdings.  
E.D. Texas 
 
EnerPol, LLC v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 2:17-CV-00394-JRG, 
2018 WL 1335191 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2018). 
 
This case concerns the proper construction of claim terms in a patent 
application for a degradable polymer made to assist in the process of 
creating fractures in the subsurface during oil and gas fracking. The parties 
were in dispute concerning the term “polymer-continuous liquid phase.” 
Company-1 contended that the phrase constituted two terms while 
Company-2 construed it as only one term. Company-1 also proposed that 
the term “polymer continuous” entails a network of polymer while 
Company-2 contended it is simply a polymer. Finally, the parties disputed 
whether or not the term “liquid phase” meant the polymer must be entirely 
in liquid form as claimed by Company-2. In this phrase, the court seemed to 
find a middle ground, determining that the term meant “polymer in a liquid 
state that is greater than fifty percent (50%) by volume of the fluid that does 
the fracturing in the formation.” The court further defined the terms 
“selected” and “low viscosity” as having their ordinary meanings and “solid 
form” as meaning “solid bulk form.” 
 
Other Issues – Federal 
 
D. North Dakota 
 
El Petron Enters., LLC v. Whiting Res. Corp., No. 1:16–cv–090, 2018 WL 
1322391 (D.N.D. Mar. 14, 2018). 
 
Lessee sued Distributor, alleging that Distributor had improperly deducted 
from the overriding royal interests of Lessee. Lessee argued that 
Distributor's deduction for third-party post-production costs was improper 
because of language in the assignment's overriding royalty reservation. 
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Distributor claimed that the "free and clear of all costs" language in the 
assignment described the free-of-production-costs feature of an overriding 
royalty, while Lessee contended that the language changed the "at the well" 
rule with respect to post-production costs. Citing North Dakota Supreme 
Court precedent, the district court held that Distributor should include post-
production costs in assessing an overriding royalty's value, but Distributor 
cannot deduct costs from that sum. The court determined that Distributor 
could properly deduct post-production costs when used in the Production 
Royalty calculation. 
 




Maralex Res., Inc. v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2018 
COA 40, No. 17CA0051, 2018 WL 1417462.  
 
Operator challenged both the search and finding of violations through the 
search by Commission. Commission’s search revealed several ongoing 
violations, including contaminated soil and equipment not being properly 
stored. The Colorado appellate court held that Commission’s search was 
not a constitutional violation because the industry is “closely regulated.” 
Additionally, the search satisfied a multi-part test that requires: (1) a 
legitimate government or public interest, (2) that the search is required to 
carry out that government interest; and (3) that the search is part of a 
regular or routine schedule and was not completely unforeseeable. Since 
Commission’s searches were intended and required to monitor oil and gas 
sites and were conducted on a relatively consistent schedule, the test was 
satisfied. The court also found that Operator’s claim of interference with the 
surface estate was not persuasive because an expansive “surface use 
agreement” was in place between Operator as an entity and surface owner 
(surface owner owns the company and also acts as Operator). The court 
disagreed with the decision of Commission and the lower court in only one 
respect: the court reversed the district court’s support of Commission’s 
finding that Operator did not reasonably provide Commission access to the 
subject property. According to the court, this finding was arbitrary and 
capricious on the part of Commission. Ultimately, the court held that 
Commission’s search of Operator’s premises, while impromptu, was not in 
violation of the state constitution’s protections, even though Operator’s 
family resided on the property. The court reversed and remanded the district 
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court’s decision regarding the one violation mentioned above but affirmed 




Rogers Cartage Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2018 IL App (5th) 160098, 
No. 5–16–0098, 2018 WL 1661799.   
 
Insurer breached its duty to Policyholder when it refused to defend and 
indemnify Policyholder’s $7,500,000 settlement in an underlying suit 
disputing responsibility of toxic spill cleanups in Illinois. The lower court 
found that Insurer’s failure to settle was in bad faith and Insurer therefore 
had a duty to pay the settlement. In addition, the court awarded 
Policyholder attorney fees. Insurer appealed and argued that the policy's 
pollution exclusions applied and barred coverage because Policyholder 
intended or expected contamination to result from its actions and because 
Policyholder’s toxic discharge was illegal. The Illinois appellate court 
upheld the lower court’s finding and held that Insurer breached its duty to 
defend by threatening to end coverage if Policyholder settled. Due to the 
breach of Insurer’s duty to defend, Insurer was estopped from raising 
defenses to coverage. Additionally, the court held that even if Insurer did 
not breach this duty, its arguments against coverage held no merit. The 
court further held that Policyholder did not intend to cause contamination, it 
took measures to contain toxins, and there was insufficient evidence to 
show that Policyholder’s actions were illegal. Appellate court also upheld 




Red Sox Invs., LLC v. City of Shreveport, 51-817 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18) 
No. 51,817-CA, 2018 WL 1076799. 
 
This case involves the treatment of several tracts of land that had been 
adjudicated to City after the property in question failed to be sold at tax 
sale. After the failed sale, City executed mineral leases on the adjudicated 
properties. Property Owner claimed that the City illegally took the property, 
misallocated mineral lease revenue from the properties, and denied other 
owners the opportunity to execute mineral leases on the affected properties. 
Property Owner claimed that any lease revenue was to be applied toward 
past-due taxes and any amounts over given to the property owners. City 
claimed that the law requiring the distribution of lease revenue did not 
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apply to mineral leases. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana 
agreed and held that City adequately followed the procedure following the 
tax sale and that Property Owner was not deprived of the right to lease the 




ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 61 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 605 (Tex. Mar. 23, 
2018).  
 
Lessee requested review of a lower court decision to determine whether the 
rule against perpetuities was violated by a lease clause allowing a 
distinction for Lessor to hold a non-participating royalty interest “as long 
thereafter as there is production” from a well. The Supreme Court of Texas 
held that such interest was not eliminated because the referenced interested 
was actually “certain to vest” at the time of the lease, even though it was a 
future interest. Additionally, the Court noted that since this was a mineral 
interest, the issues that accompany the rule against perpetuities, like the 
feared restrictions on alienability, are not applicable as in a case of 
conveyance of property. The Court also held, however, that the savings 
clause contained in the lease, specifically the provision of “other similar 
payments,” was too ambiguous, did not provide adequate clarity, and could 
not be considered a reflection of the intent of each party. Accordingly, the 
Court agreed with the lower court that the ambiguity of the savings clause 
required further review and interpretation. The Court also affirmed the 
appellate court’s decisions regarding attorney’s fees and that Lessor’s claim 
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Federal 
 
9th Circuit  
 
TDY Holdings, LLC v. United States, 885 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 
This opinion is an amended decision of a case that was summarized in a 
previous volume of the ONE-J journal. The present opinion denied a 
petition for rehearing. For the full summary of the previous opinion, please 




Donelson v. United States, No. 16-5174, 2018 WL 1638825 (10th Cir. Apr. 
5, 2018).  
 
Through a class action suit, Complainants appealed Department’s decision 
to approve regulatory oil and gas activity because the party claimed such 
activity violated NEPA and its private property rights. Complainants 
asserted a trespass tort claim, requesting monetary damages and injunctive 
relief from such activity. Specifically, Complainants claimed that there was 
no follow up activity or monitoring regarding an initial Environmental 
Assessment conducted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in order to assess 
potential impacts of the oil and gas leases and activity permits, even after 
the details of such oil and gas arrangements had changed. Complainants 
own surface interests in land which are also involved, via the severed 
mineral interests, in oil and gas leasing conducted and approved by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, finding that Complainants’ claims were 
appropriately dismissed due to Complainants’ failure to “adequately 
identify the particular agency actions that aggrieve them and explain how 
they are final.” According to the court, Complainants ultimately lacked 
standing and the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear such a claim due to the 
inadequacy of the supporting information provided. Please note that this is 
an unpublished opinion of the court. Therefore, state or federal court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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Sierra Club v. EPA, 884 F.3d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2018).   
 
After EPA proposed new, revised regulations regarding air quality, the 
proposed rules were challenged by Advocates. Advocates challenged in two 
ways. First, Advocates claimed that a regulation purporting to control 
organic pollutant emissions was modified in a way that was inconsistent 
with the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Second, Advocates claimed that the 
regulations that controlled operations of boilers were too lax, neglecting to 
impose technical pollutant requirements and imposing “qualitative ‘work 
practice’ standards” or recommendations to initiate boiler operations “as 
expeditiously as possible.” The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held that Advocates’ first challenge was valid but that the second 
was not. Because EPA did not provide enough support for its change to 
organic pollutant limits and its deviation from existing standards, 
Advocates’ challenge was granted regarding that claim. However, the 
second challenge to EPA’s proposed modified regulations was denied 
because such standards, even though not precise, are reasonable estimates 
and so were still consistent with the existing regulations.  
 
D. District of Columbia 
 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 16–1861 (JDB), 2018 WL 
1568882 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2018).  
 
In accordance with the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which requires states to 
develop plans to regulate water pollution levels, Maryland and the District 
of Columbia together developed a plan to control the amount of trash in the 
Anacostia River. But, rather than set “total maximum daily load” 
(“TMDL”) of pollutants may enter the river, as is discussed in the CWA, 
the two jurisdictions instead jointly created a water quality plan (“Plan”) 
establishing a minimum amount of waste to be removed or prevented from 
entering the river in order to satisfy the water quality standards. 
Consequently, Environmental Advocacy Organization (“Environmental 
Organization”) filed suit, challenging EPA’s approval of the Plan and 
contending that its proposed approach would be inconsistent with the 
language of the CWA. Ultimately, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia found for Environmental Organization noting that the 
Plan, as currently laid out, did not adequately establish a “maximum daily 
load” consistent with the plain language and meaning of the phrase as used 
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in the CWA. As such, approval of the Plan was vacated and remanded to 




W. Org. of Res. Councils v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 16-21-GF-
BMM, 2018 WL 1475470 (D. Mont. Mar. 26, 2018). 
 
Conservation Advocates challenged the Bureau of Land Management’s 
(“BLM”) plan revisions related to habitat management of federally owned 
lands throughout Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Wyoming. Conservation Advocates sought recourse from a variety of 
environmental claims based on BLM's alleged violation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act. The district court ruled that, because the BLM 
did not entirely update the plans to reflect a full consideration of climate 
change impacts on resources, BLM would be required to prepare 
environmental analyses to supplement the existing updated management 
plan. The court did not make a final ruling on Conservation Advocate's 
request to enjoin the leasing or development of energy resources on the 
effected land. The court found the BLM's failure to develop alternative 
levels of potential coal development as inadequate for allowing the BLM's 
to make a "reasoned choice" about the best course of action as to closing 




Hammond, Kennedy, Whitney & Co. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 16-cv-
9808, 2018 WL 587182 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2018). 
 
Manufacturer acquired, via a stock purchase, a property that was later found 
to have contamination due to underground gas storage tanks. Attorney, 
acting on behalf of the property’s predecessor, filed suit seeking a 
declaratory judgment that Attorney would not have to indemnify 
Manufacture for environmental cleanup and related costs at the site. As 
required by state law, once the contamination was discovered and certain 
level of pollutants detected, Manufacturer notified the state and relayed to 
Attorney that the stock purchase agreement provided for indemnification 
for the contamination. Attorney brought suit seeking a declaration that 
Attorney was under no duty to indemnify Manufacturer for the remediation 
and associated costs arising out of the storage tank contamination. The 
stock purchase agreement was governed by New York law, while the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
196 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 
environmental claims were subject to the laws of Indiana, the state in which 
the contamination took place. The stock purchase agreement contained 
warranties and indemnity provisions outlining Manufacturer’s process for 
future environmental issues. The court found that Attorney did not meets its 
burden in seeking the declaration from the court. Manufacturer properly 
notified Attorney of the breach of warranty, the reasoning for the warranty 
claims, and the legal duty and requirement for Manufacturer to remediate. 
Therefore, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, Eastern Division, found that Attorney failed to prove that no 




EQT Prod. Co. v. Terra Servs., LLC, No. 14-1053, 2018 WL 658871 (W.D. 
Pa. Feb. 1, 2018). 
Operator filed suit against Water Treatment Company (“Company”) for 
breach of express warranty, breach of contract, contractual indemnification, 
and common law indemnification for Company’s actions resulting in 
damage which caused “leakage of impaired fluids . . . into surrounding land 
and water.” Company filed for partial summary judgment on its claim for 
attorney’s fees in the action, and on Operator’s Petition for Review of the 
civil penalty assessed against it by the Environmental Hearing Board 
(“Board”). The Pennsylvania district court found that (1) there was no basis 
in the language of the contract for Company’s assertion that the document 
directly contemplated the allowance of attorney’s fees; (2) the Restatement 
of Contracts was inapplicable, and the facts of this particular instance were 
enough that a court could find consequential damages allowable; and (3) 
because the civil penalty was assessed to Operator without consideration of 
the potential liability of its subcontractors. Thus, Operator’s Petition for 
Review of the civil penalty was not barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the 











Don’t Cell Our Parks v. City of San Diego, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Mar. 15, 2018). 
 
Preservationist filed a writ of mandate against City, claiming that City had 
impermissibly approved the construction of a small cellphone service tower 
in a public park. Preservationist claimed that the project fell within an 
alteration to legislation demanding that parks may only be used for 
recreational purposes and that any other purpose must be agreed upon by a 
two-thirds majority vote by the city council. The trial court denied 
Preservationist’s petition. The appellate court explained that City has the 
discretion to set aside this two-thirds majority vote requirement for any 
purposes deemed necessary by City. Because the proposed cellphone tower 
would lead to enhanced coverage for the community and because the tower 
was relatively inconspicuous on a nine-acre plot of land, the appellate court 
affirmed and allowed the construction of the tower. 
 
Rodeo Citizens Ass’n v. Cty. of Contra Costa, 22 Cal. App. 5th 214 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2018).  
 
Citizens Association (“Citizens”) appealed a decision in which the trial 
court issued a peremptory writ of mandate, in Citizens’ favor, requiring a 
county to reevaluate various air quality issues in an Environmental Impact 
Report (“EIR”), but rejected Citizens’ remaining arguments. The California 
Court of Appeal for the First District, Division 3 found that the following 
did not fail to comply with the requirements set forth in the California 
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”): (1) the description of the “Propane 
Recovery Project” and (2) the analysis used in making determinations 
regarding greenhouse gas emissions and environmental hazards. 
Accordingly, the appellate court found no error by the lower court and 
affirmed the writ as originally issued.  
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New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 181 A.3d 257, (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). 
 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) brought 
suit against oil refinery owner (“Refinery”) for claims under the Spill Act, 
common law claims of public nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, and 
sought natural resource damages (“NRD”) for the discharge of hazardous 
substances at two facilities. During trial, NJDEP provided public notice of a 
previous settlement proposed by Refinery in order to release certain NRD 
claims. The release of the information regarding the settlement caused an 
uproar with people objecting to the settlement. At trial, the court rejected 
the applications of environmental groups and a state senator to intervene 
finding that these parties did not have standing, and the court approved the 
consent judgement regarding the proposed settlement. These environmental 
groups and state senator appeal the rejection of their motions to intervene 
and the consent judgment.  On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division, upheld the lower court’s consent judgment. However, it 
found that the environmental groups had standing to appeal the trial court’s 
consent judgment based on their broad representation of citizens’ interests 
throughout the state, but the state Senator lacked standing because he 




EnvironmentaLEE v. N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. & Nat. Res. Div. of Waste Mgmt., 
No. COA17-907, 2018 WL 1597452 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018).  
 
Citizens appealed Agency’s decision regarding standing of a permit to use 
coal ash as infill for mines. The ALJ converted Citizens’ motion for 
summary judgment into a motion for involuntary dismissal, which was then 
granted because Citizens failed to provide sufficient proof that their 
interests were violated or that Permittees otherwise acted inappropriately. 
The court partially affirmed and partially reversed the decision, holding that 
the applicability of the final decision regarding mined or excavated areas 
was affirmed, but the applicability of the final decision regarding unmined 
or unexcavated areas was reversed, and related permits were improperly 
approved and issued and were therefore revoked. This judgment meant that 
mining activity was allowed to go on in already active mined areas, “but 
coal ash may only be used as structural fill in the areas mined or excavated 
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at the time the permits were issued.” The court held that the ALJ and 
superior court erred in both interpreting procedural rules and applying 
standards of review. Therefore, this matter was remanded to fix the 
referenced errors and allow Citizens to provide additional supporting 




Consol. Rail Corp. v. ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2018 PA Super 68, No. 
1376 EDA 2015, 2018 WL 1442507. 
 
Railroad sued Insurer, claiming that the insurance policy between the two 
parties was ambiguous in its definition of the “occurrences” for which 
Railroad would be insured. Railroad argued that the contamination that 
damaged a third party’s property was attributable to Railroad’s predecessor 
in interest, but that this “occurrence” was covered by Insurer’s ambiguous 
policy. However, because Railroad could not point to specific instances of a 
predecessor’s activities that caused the contamination, it failed to meet the 
requisite burden of proof, so the matter of contract interpretation was moot. 
Insurer claimed that Railroad knew that the sites covered by the policy were 
contaminated and that any losses suffered as a result of acquiring those 
properties were covered by the “Known Loss Doctrine.” Therefore, Insurer 
claimed that any policy covering these sites was unenforceable. However, 
the court denied Insurer’s motion for summary judgment on this theory, 
finding that Insurer failed to adequately prove Railroad’s knowledge of the 
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